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Abstract
Is it possible to estimate the real impact of micro-task crowdwork on wages and work-
ing conditions of platform workers? Do workers involved in micro-task outsourcing differ
in their characteristics from traditional salaried workers of similar ability? Are micro-task
crowdworkers similar or different in the United States and in Europe? In this paper,
we address these questions by comparing wages and working conditions across online-
platform workers and traditional workers in a quasi-experimental approach which exploits
caregiving as an instrument for participation in crowdwork. We find evidence that, when
controlling for workers’ observed and unobserved ability, traditional workers retain a sig-
nificant premium in their earnings with respect to platform workers, though this effect is
not as large as descriptive statistics may hint. Moreover, labour force in crowdworking
arrangements appears to suffer from high levels of under-utilisation, relegating crowd-
workers into a new category of idle workers whose human capital is neither fully utilised
nor adequately compensated.
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tions.
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1 Introduction
Among the ’mega-trends’ which characterise the future of work, the growth of the online
platform economy has been steady and fast in the recent years and has been contributing to
the changing nature of work (OECD, 2017, Harris & Krueger, 2015).1 Technological progress
and digitalisation are at the basis of its current development. Due to the overall exponential
growth of internet facilities, indeed, recent years have shown an increasing number of work-
ers participating in what is described as the ’gig’, ’on-demand’, or ’platform-based’ economy
(Degryse, 2016, Prassl & Risak, 2015). These workers are called ’crowdworkers’, where crowd-
work is defined as an ’employment form that uses an online platform to enable organisations
or individuals to access an indefinite and unknown group of other organisations or individuals
to solve specific problems or to provide specific services or products in exchange for payment’
(Eurofound, 2015).
The economic conditions of crowdworkers have been widely reported in a number of de-
scriptive studies (e.g. Berg et al., 2018, Berg, 2015, Difallah et al., 2018, Hara et al., 2017,
De Groen et al., 2017): it arises that these workers appear to suffer from the erosion of fun-
damental labour rights, the loss of social protections and difficulties in exercising collective
actions. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that platform work has a causal effect
on working conditions solely based on the evidence of these descriptive studies, as it could be
argued that the characteristics of crowdwork are intrinsically different from traditional salar-
ied professions. More definitive answers are needed, especially in light of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development and the goals of the United Nations and the European Parliament
in terms of decent work and social rights.2
Given the likelihood that the online platform economy will further expand in the coming
years, it is crucial for governments and social partners to take an active role in designing
labour market institutions (e.g. minimum wages, employment protection, health and safety
regulations) that can ensure labour and social rights for this type of workers. This is especially
urgent for platform workers involved in the so-called micro-tasks (a series of small tasks which
together comprise a large unified project and can be performed independently over the Internet
in a short period of time), which are more exposed to risks concerning low pay, precariousness
1According to the OECD (2016), the online platform economy is the economic activity which enables
transactions - partly or fully online - of goods, services and information.
2During the UN General Assembly in September 2015, the four pillars of the Decent Work Agenda –
employment creation, social protection, rights at work, and social dialogue – became part of the new UN
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development). At the same time, the European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2017
recognised the need to set a European Pillar of Social Rights also for ’atypical or non-standard forms of
employment, such as temporary work, involuntary part-time work, casual work, seasonal work, on-demand
work, dependent self-employment or work intermediated by digital platforms’ (European Parliament, 2017,
European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2017 on a European Pillar of Social Rights).
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and poor working conditions (Prpić et al., 2015).3
In light of these critical issues, in this paper we analyse a large fraction of the available
evidence on earning and working conditions of crowdworkers involved in micro-tasks. Our
focus is on the evidence from the United States and Europe and our main goal is to answer to
the following questions: Do crowdworkers involved in micro-tasks differ in their characteristics
from traditional salaried workers involved in similar occupations? Are micro-task crowdwork-
ers from the US similar or different from crowdworkers from Europe? Is it possible to estimate
the real impact of micro-task crowdwork on wages and working conditions of platform work-
ers? Is incidence of labour market slack in crowdwork higher than that in traditional forms of
salaried employment?
Our contribution is based on an empirical analysis of cross-sectional data collected from
three different surveys and harmonised in order to obtain the greatest degree of comparability.
The approach we adopt is quasi-experimental, in line with the ’Treatment Effect’ literature
(see Angrist & Pischke, 2011): the aim is to provide an unbiased comparison of earnings and
working conditions of platform workers and ’traditional’ workers across control and treatment
groups, where variations in outcomes are analysed conditionally on a binary ’treatment’ vari-
able indicating participation into crowdwork. For both US and Europe the treatment groups
include information on crowdworkers from a number of online platforms – namely, Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT), Crowdflower, Clickworker, Microworkers and Prolific Academic –
coming from two dedicated surveys distributed by the International Labour Organization,
while the control groups include information from available extended surveys on American
and European workers’ conditions (American Working Conditions Survey, European Working
Conditions Survey).
Our findings indicate that, overall, crowdworkers earn about 70.6% less than ’traditional’
workers with comparable ability, while working only a few hours less per week. Similar fig-
ures are obtained for the European and American samples separately. Also, platform workers
appear to be uninterested in looking for other forms of occupation, while still expressing the
desire to work more than what they currently do. These results suggest that most crowd-
workers are similar to a form of idle workforce, which is excluded from traditional employment
and is still under-utilised. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to
provide an unbiased comparison of platform and traditional workers in terms of earnings and
working conditions in a quasi-experimental design. Moreover, contrarily to most other studies
on the online platform economy, which concentrate on US crowdworkers, we here focus on
both United States and Europe.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the online micro-task
labour market, Section 3 is dedicated to a review of the literature, Section 4 (together with the
3As opposed to individuals participating in online freelancing marketplaces (such as UpWork), where con-
ditions are generally more favourable and projects are usually larger in scope.
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Appendix) describes the data used for our empirical analysis, Section 5 outlines our empirical
specification and Sections 6 and 7 show our results and robustness checks. Finally, in Section
8 we discuss our conclusions.
2 The online micro-task labour market
Phenomena such as crowdwork do not exist in a vacuum, but are fostered and facilitated by
wider socio-economic trends, and the development of ’virtual work’ can surely be identified
as one of these. The term virtual work has been used by many authors to describe all of the
various forms of work characterised by the execution of work through the Internet, computers,
or other IT-based tools (Valenduc & Vendramin, 2016). However, not all digital jobs are
necessarily a novelty per se, and not all new jobs are digital. While new forms of employment
have surfaced, pre-existing ones have acquired a new role and relevance, thanks to the influence
of new technologies.4
Crowd employment is one of these new forms of employment and transcends traditional
employment arrangements by de facto requiring a tripartite relationship in which an inter-
mediary agent - the platform - manages workers - or, rather, service providers - not only by
matching them with clients but also controlling pay levels, providing ratings and generally
exercising many other functions that affect workers directly. Within the platform, through
an open call, client companies can offer online tasks, which are performed by contractors in
exchange for remuneration (see, e.g., Eurofound, 2015). Because the the majority of online
platforms explicitly deny the existence of any employment relationship between the parties,
individuals in crowd employment arrangements are generally characterised as independent
contractors, performing their work in a discontinuous or intermittent basis.
Amazon Mechanical Turk easily stands as a prime example of a crowdwork platform, being
widely recognised as one of the most popular ones (see Harris & Krueger, 2015). The short
and repetitive tasks offered in the platform often include: image/video processing, translation,
data verification, information gathering and processing, audio and visual editing, amongst
many others.5 Crowdwork arrangements may, however, vary greatly: skill requirements for
outsourced jobs may range from high to low and, while tasks with low abstract content are
prevalent – as, for example, most tasks in Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), Clickworker and
Figure-Eight – complex and even creative activities are also present.
Crowd employment can then be identified as a phenomenon that essentially entails a new,
and substantially cheaper, way of outsourcing tasks to a large pool of workers through IT-based
platforms (Prassl & Risak, 2015) and, because of this, it has also been defined as “crowd-
4Eurofound (2015) has identified nine distinct new forms of employment: employee sharing, job sharing,
interim management, casual work, ICT-based mobile work, voucher-based work, portfolio work, crowd employ-
ment and collaborative employment.
5As described in AMT website: https://www.mturk.com/ (last accessed: 19th September 2018).
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sourcing”.6 By requiring platforms as intermediate actors, crowdwork manages to virtually
nullify most transaction costs, thus allowing for a flexible and ’extremely scalable’ workforce
(De Stefano, 2015) to enter the labour market and maximise the use of under-utilised assets
such as human capital.7
3 Literature review
Tackling the issues related to micro-task crowdsourcing has proven to be a multifaceted effort
which, so far, has seen the intervention of different disciplines such as law (see, for example,
Prassl & Risak, 2015, De Stefano, 2015), information technology and economics. Compared
to other areas of study, the body of research on the economics of crowdsourcing has been, so
far, remarkably thin: a glaring lacuna, considering the growing size of the platform economy.
As suggested by Hara et al. (2017), this scarcity of literature is mostly attributable to the
absence of publicly available data on crowdwork platforms and their workers, in addition to
a variety of methodological issues concerning the type of data to analyse and the empirical
approach to be used.8 Nonetheless, as discussed by Horton et al. (2011), Mason & Suri
(2011), Paolacci et al. (2010) and Berinsky et al. (2012), crowdwork platforms potentially
present themselves as an ideal environment for empirical studies, in particular those based on
experimental research. In this regard, Horton & Chilton (2010) offer one the first attempts
to obtain empirical evidence on reservation wages in crowd employment from an experimental
framework. Another overview of experimental methods in the field of online economy is
provided by Prpic & Shukla (2016), who also produce a definition of crowd capital.9 Other
contributions focus instead on the demand side of these markets, concentrating on task pricing
and worker productivity optimisation (e.g. Mason & Watts, 2009, Singer & Mittal, 2011).
Several additional descriptive studies have been provided. Harris & Krueger (2015) docu-
ment the development of the platform economy and call for the recognition of an independent
worker status, while other studies, receiving support from international institutions such as
ILO (Berg, 2015 and Berg et al., 2018), CEPS (De Groen et al., 2017), and FEPS (Huws
et al., 2017), have contributed to the literature with a thorough overview of the demographics
of crowdsourcing. Hara et al. (2017) document wage and working time amongst AMT crowd-
workers, discussing the necessity of including the time spent searching for tasks in working
6A term which was first used by Jeff Howe in his article ’The Rise of Crowdsourcing’, Wired Magazine, 14.
7The ability to provide services online significantly enlarges the scope of crowdwork markets, thus enabling
services to be provided globally, as opposed to the local focus of the services offered by work-on-demand
platforms (such as Uber, Foodora, or Taskrabbit), which are characterised by the physical and tangible nature
of the tasks being offered.
8Most of these issues will be explicitly reviewed in the Sections 4 and 5.
9Crowd capital is here defined as the ’potential outcome of IT-mediated crowd engagement’, which ’like
the other forms of capital in the literature, (social capital, financial capital, human capital etc.), [...] requires
investment (for example in crowd capability dimensions), and potentially leads to literal or figurative dividends
for the organisation’.
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time indicators, while a recent paper from Difallah et al. (2018) summarises the main take-
aways from a longitudinal survey on AMT whose data has been published in the mturk tracker
website, curated by Ipeirotis (2010).10
Another important contribution on the analysis of the platform economy in US comes from
Katz & Krueger (2016), where the two economists, in the context of studying the evolution
of all alternative work arrangements from 2005 to 2015, estimate that, out of all occupations,
0.5% involve the direct selling of activities and services mediated by an online intermediary –
a figure that can proxy the size of the so called gig-economy11 (see Harris & Krueger, 2015).
Crowdwork can be considered as another form of service outsourcing, as such other con-
tributions should be taken into consideration. There is an ample body of literature on service
outsourcing and its labour market effects, mostly dedicated to analysing whether aggregate
labour demand is affected by complementarities or substitution effects. Amiti et al. (2005)
and Amiti & Wei (2009) offer evidence on the impact of service offshoring in the UK and
US, predicting no significant effects on aggregate employment. In contrast, Görg & Hanley
(2005) find negative employment effects for both material and service outsourcing. Other
scholars – such as Degryse (2016) – suggest that crowd employment could be equated to a
form of digital migration and, in this regard, Ottaviano et al. (2013) offer a valuable study of
the labour market effects of migration and task offshoring. Proxying substitutability through
routine intensity of tasks – a concept originally introduced by Autor & Dorn (2013) which
spurred a novel body of literature focusing on the task-based approach to labour markets –
Ottaviano et al. (2013) find that service outsourcing, while having no effect on employment,
has changed the task composition of native workers. The relationship between unemployment
and micro-task labour markets was further explored in Borchert et al. (2018), where labour
demand shocks have been found to affect temporary participation in online labour markets.
Finally, the effects of digital labour markets on high skilled service flows are instead in-
vestigated in Horton et al. (2017), where the focus is on the UpWork freelancing platform.
4 Data
Finding appropriate sources of information for our analysis has proved to be a rather demand-
ing task. The first difficulty has been the identification of crowdworkers in existing large-scale
survey data on workers and working conditions. The European Working Conditions Survey
(EWCS) and the American Working Conditions Survey (AWCS) both contain comparable
10The survey contains data on country, gender, age, income from AMT, time spent on AMT, marital
status, household income and household size of Mechanical Turk workers, and can be accessed at the ad-
dress: http://demographics.mturk-tracker.com/
11The term ’gig economy’ is the umbrella term that has been most frequently used by the literature to ana-
lyse work-on-demand and crowdwork, emphasising the temporary nature of the work relationship undergoing
between ’clients’ and ’service providers’ (see Degryse, 2016 and Prassl & Risak, 2015).
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data on wages, job quality and skills but, in these cases, it is arduous to disentangle platform
workers from any freelancer working from home. As micro-task crowdsourcers tend to perform
specific, routine intensive activities, we expect that equating them to any freelancer working
from home will likely pose a serious source of bias. While growing, the size of the platform
economy is still minor, so platform workers will naturally be under-represented in general
surveys.
Dedicated surveys on crowdworkers have been very useful in this regard.12 However, while
there is currently plenty of information on work on digital platforms – acquired either through
online questionnaires (e.g. Berg, 2015, Berg et al., 2018, Huws et al., 2017, Ipeirotis, 2010) or
web plug-ins (e.g. Hara et al., 2017) – the methodologies behind the collection of this data
often differ significantly, with the resulting surveys varying not only in their sample sizes but
also in terms of item comparability. With the aim to provide a reliable empirical analysis of
the effects of crowdwork on labour market conditions in United States and in Europe, our
initial efforts have focused on ascertaining which datasets would have allowed us to maximise
the comparability of our results while retaining a satisfactory pool of observations and key
variables.
After careful consideration, the information on online platform workers collected by the
ILO Surveys on Crowdworkers (Berg, 2015, and Berg et al., 2018) has been used to build
our treatment groups, which have then been paired with the AWCS and EWCS data, used
as controls. By harmonizing the ILO survey on crowdworkers with these general working
conditions surveys from the EU and the US, we believe we are making a step forward in
putting these new forms of work into a comparative and global perspective.
4.1 Treatment and control groups
In order to build our treatment sample, we extracted information on European and US crowd-
workers from the two rounds of the ILO survey on Crowdworkers (Berg, 2015 and Berg et al.,
2018). Thanks to the similarities in terms of the relevant variables of analysis, our control
groups were constructed using data from the American Working Conditions Survey and from
the European Working Conditions Survey.
The dataset from Berg (2015) and Berg et al. (2018) consists of two consecutive surveys
conducted on a number of online platforms13 between 2015 and 2017 and covers crowdworkers
from both the United States and Europe. The 2015 round of the survey provides cross-sectional
data on earnings, demographics and working quality indicators for 1,167 crowdworkers from all
over the world. The 2017 round similarly provides this information for a much larger number
of workers (n = 2350), while also supplying a number of crucial variables that can be used to
reconstruct the task composition of online platform work. Using information from both rounds
12See Berg, 2015, Berg et al., 2018, Huws et al. 2017, Difallah et al., 2018, Peer et al., 2017.
13In detail: Amazon Mechanical Turk , Crowdflower, Clickworker, Microworkers and Prolific Academic.
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Table I
Mean-comparison t-tests across type of workers
US EU
Control Crowdwork diff. Control Crowdwork diff.
Hourly nominal earnings (USD) 30,774 7,208 -23.566*** 17,058 6,585 -10.473***
(207,851) (7,483) (91,886) (28,970)
Hourly nominal earnings (USD)† 30,774 5,433 -25.341*** 17,058 3,901 -13.157***
(207,851) (5,079) (91,886) (18,574)
Weekly working hours 39,056 21,180 -17.876*** 37,176 14,697 -22.479***
(11,655) (20,511) (11,901) (24,137)
Weekly working hours† 39,056 28,266 -10.789*** 37,176 19,903 -17.273***
(11,655) (26,422) (11,901) (32,601)
Age 41,024 35,027 -5.997*** 42,207 35,543 -6.663***
(12,615) (10,934) (11,390) (11,137)
Female 0,463 0,476 0.013 0,478 0,426 -0.051***
(0,499) (0,500) (0,500) (0,495)
Married or living with a partner 0,516 0,434 -0.082*** 0,697 0,493 -0.204***
(0,500) (0,496) (0,459) (0,500)
No. of people in household 3,063 2,665 -0.398*** 2,882 2,819 -0.063
(1,672) (1,429) (1,268) (1,260)
Main earner in household 0,603 0,789 0.186*** 0,595 0,815 0.220***
(0,489) (0,408) (0,491) (0,389)
Educ.: no high school diploma 0,064 0,009 -0.055*** 0,161 0,052 -0.109***
(0,244) (0,092) (0,367) (0,222)
Educ.: high school diploma 0,502 0,374 -0.128*** 0,448 0,309 -0.139***
(0,500) (0,484) (0,497) (0,462)
Educ.: technical/associate 0,097 0,157 0.061*** 0,147 0,102 -0.045***
(0,296) (0,364) (0,354) (0,303)
Educ.: bachelor’s degree 0,208 0,348 0.141*** 0,127 0,322 0.195***
(0,406) (0,477) (0,333) (0,468)
Educ.: master’s degree 0,094 0,097 0.003 0,108 0,165 0.056***
(0,292) (0,296) (0,311) (0,371)
Educ.: higher 0,036 0,015 -0.021*** 0,009 0,051 0.042***
(0,185) (0,122) (0,092) (0,219)
Health: Very Good 0,132 0,244 0.112*** 0,261 0,257 -0.003
(0,338) (0,429) (0,439) (0,437)
Health: Good 0,407 0,534 0.128*** 0,532 0,523 -0.008
(0,491) (0,499) (0,499) (0,500)
Health: Fair 0,345 0,180 -0.165*** 0,185 0,178 -0.007
(0,475) (0,384) (0,389) (0,383)
Health: Poor 0,099 0,037 -0.062*** 0,020 0,033 0.013**
(0,299) (0,190) (0,140) (0,178)
Health: Very Poor 0,018 0,005 -0.013 0,002 0,008 0.006*
(0,132) (0,071) (0,048) (0,090)
Caregiving (15h/week) 0,149 0,207 0.058*** 0,170 0,112 -0.058***
(0,356) (0,405) (0,375) (0,315)
Caregiving (40h/week) 0,082 0,207 0.124*** 0,020 0,112 0.092***
(0,275) (0,405) (0,139) (0,315)
N otes: Standard errors in parentheses. Summary statistics and t-test are calculated from our weighted US and EU reference
samples, formed by our control (AWCS and EWCS data) and treatment (ILO data) groups. The sample is restricted to employed
and self-employed individuals in working age. †: adjusted for time spent in unpaid activities.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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of the survey, we extracted a treatment group of 1,393 US crowdworkers and 1,000 European14
crowdworkers, where dimensions such as earnings, working hours, work quality and proxies for
labour utilisation were all recorded along with demographical characteristics including gender,
age, education, health condition, marital status and household size. Pivotally, this survey also
includes items which allowed us to identify whether crowdwork constituted the respondent’s
main source of income.15 Thanks to the design of the ILO survey, its contents have been
easily harmonised with data from the 2015 rounds of the European Working Conditions Survey
(EWCS) and the American Working Conditions Survey (AWCS).
As outlined earlier, we used information from the EWCS and AWCS to construct our
control groups. The AWCS surveys a sample of 3,109 individuals from the US, sharing several
dimensions in common with the ILO data. Raked post-stratification weights conforming to the
Current Population Survey (CPS) target population are already provided with the survey, and
we restricted our sample to employed working age population (n = 1,946).16 Similarly, a control
group of 32,429 employed working-age individuals from the EU28 area was extracted from the
EWCS, weighted, and paired as a control group to the data on European crowdworkers. All
data was finally aggregated on a single dataset, providing a shared set of common variables
and adjusting – when needed – all earnings for inflation and purchasing power parity.
Weighted mean comparison t-tests for a number of key dimensions across the treatment
and control groups are shown in Table I (United States: n = 3,339 and Europe: n = 33,281).
From these analysis, some apparent differences between crowdworkers and active working pop-
ulation in Unites States and Europe emerge. Mean comparison t-tests between control and
treatment groups, restricted to the employed working age population, reveal that demograph-
ical differences in salaries, age, education and marital status across forms of work. Summary
statistics for all the variables in the samples are reported in Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the
Appendix.
While earnings, as expected, appear to be lower for online platform workers, their demo-
graphical composition also shows significant differences with both control groups, with the
typical crowdworker being more likely to be younger, single and more educated overall. These
14The European data include 852 observations from the European Member States, and 148 observations
from EWCS guest countries (Norway, Switzerland, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey).
15Further details on the sampling methodology followed in the ILO surveys are available in Berg et al. (2018).
16For most our estimates,we decided not to narrow our control group based on the profession of these workers.
While an analysis of earnings and outcomes across comparable tasks (for example, in terms of routine intensity,
as suggested in Autor & Dorn, 2013 and Ottaviano et al., 2013) will not be disregarded, our causal estimates
focus on comparing workers while controlling for their ability, disregarding any bias-inducing factor – such in
the case of occupations – that could affect our estimates. For similar reasons, a small number of individuals,
which have been reporting to do freelancing work from home as their main occupation, has been omitted from
the estimations. This being considered, we restrict our control group to workers in occupations with comparable
routine and abstract task-intensity in Table III, so to provide a more complete picture of the crowdworking
phenomenon: the results included in said table, for all the aforementioned resons, are included for descriptive
purposes and should be intended void of any causal interpretation.
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Figure I
Participation in crowdsourcing versus traditional occupations by age
N otes: The figure shows the probability density functions of age by type of work across the US and European
samples. Control sample is restricted to employed and self-employed individuals in working age, excluding freel-
ancers working from home.
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differences are likely explained by the younger relative age of platform workers, being years of
schooling and marital status obviously correlated with age. Notably, Figure I pictures parti-
cipation in crowdsourcing conditional on age for both forms of work, showing how platform
workers tend to occupy those younger age cohorts where individuals are more likely to be ex-
cluded from traditional forms of employment. This age differential affects the likeliness of not
being married or having children, explaining the higher propensity of being the main earner in
the household and the smaller household size amongst crowdworkers. The condition of caring
for children or disabled relatives, as will be discussed later, also appears more common to
platform workers.
Looking at each region, differences in earnings also appear to be much more pronounced in
the United States than in Europe, where the differential with traditional occupations increases
from 10.47 USD in EU to 23.56 USD in US. Similarly, European crowdworkers, on average,
appear to work fairly less than their US counterparts. Other disparities emerge in terms of
gender (where a male majority is statistically significant in EU), health status and education:
controlling for these differences in a regression setting may help explain the gap between
earnings and working hours differentials.
4.2 Selected labour market indicators and controls
In order to compare crowdworkers and traditional salaried workers, we selected a number of
key labour market indicators. With our data being extracted from different sources, a number
of variables have been subjected to recoding for the sake of harmonisation. Keeping the
changes in variability minimal, the final coding sometimes differs across our US and European
samples. In many cases, the changes have been negligible, but will nonetheless be reported
when needed.
Hourly and weekly nominal earnings have been selected as our variables of most interest,
being, without doubt, a fundamental dimension of working conditions. In all groups, we are
able to control whether crowdsourcing is the main source of income for the respondent: we
expect weekly earnings to be altered by this condition, while hourly earnings should remain
unaffected.
Another crucial dimension of interest is weekly working hours. Thanks to the ILO survey,
we were able to estimate how much time crowdworkers spend on the platform between paid
and unpaid tasks. This also allowed us to investigate the differential in our earnings estimates
between crowdworkers and traditional workers when accounting for unpaid working hours.
In all instances, availability of weekly working hours proved essential for computing hourly
earnings, as all surveys do not report the hourly rate of pay, but rather weekly, monthly or
yearly absolute earnings.17
17While the ILO survey reports weekly earnings, AWCS reports yearly earnings, and EWCS lets the re-
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We were also able to conduct our analysis on a different set of dependent variables other
than earnings, allowing us to paint a more nuanced picture of the crowdworking phenomenon.
Along with indicators of skill use and job satisfaction, the EWCS, AWCS and ILO surveys
contain items for identifying if the surveyed individuals would like to work more than what
they currently do or whether they are currently looking for another occupation,18 serving as
proxies for labour use in the platform. This enabled us to identify involuntary crowdwork as
a dimension that goes beyond standard employment statistics.
In our analysis we consider a number of controls. We first control for age, gender and
education and, from there, we add other predictors. In the literature, returns to education on
earnings have been widely documented,19 while gender pay gaps have also been studied thor-
oughly.20 We can also expect marital status and the number of people living in the household
to affect earnings and working conditions in general. Finally, we control for state specific effects
and for whether the respondent is the main earner of his household. Another fundamental
variable in our analysis is caregiving, indicating whether the respondent has been involved
in full-time caring (either as a 15 or 40 hour commitment) for children or disabled/elderly
relatives. The implications of this variable for our 2SLS model will be discussed later.
Some of these variables were subject to harmonisation between the surveys. This is the
case for education, where achievements were grouped to the closest common title, while other
similar adjustments were made to marital status.
5 Model specification
Inspired by the Treatment Effect literature (Angrist & Pischke, 2011), we estimate the effect
of working in online platforms on labour market outcomes in a quasi-experimental framework,
where we compare earnings and working conditions of platform and ’traditional’ workers across
control and treatment groups. From this point of view, our approach has been certainly in-
spired by LaLonde (1986) and is not dissimilar from previous studies in part-time employment
which instrument hours of work through household size and fertility (Ermisch & Wright, 1993,
Hotchkiss, 1991, and Blank, 1998). In our case, the treatment group is composed by crowd-
workers interviewed in the ILO survey, while the control group includes workers from the
AWCS and EWCS surveys.
As platform workers are usually paid by task, and not by hour, hourly earnings are de-
termined first by the demand for those specific skills and characteristics over which clients
spondent to choose the measure he/she is most comfortable with. Hourly rate was then computed by dividing
weekly nominal earnings by weekly working hours.
18This last item was however only recorded in the AWCS and ILO.
19See, for example, Angrist & Krueger (1991) and Card & Krueger (1992).
20See Arulampalam et al. (2007), Blau & Kahn (2003), Altonji & Blank (1999) and Azmat & Petrongolo
(2014).
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can discriminate upon (factors which we can mostly control for with our set of observable
covariates) and, on the supply side, by the ability of each individual worker to complete these
tasks efficiently (which is mostly unobserved).
A simple comparison of the average outcomes between control and treatment groups is
then not sufficient for answering our research question. Descriptive analyses or ordinarily
least squares may produce biased results, potentially overestimating the effect of the platform
economy on wages and working conditions. Indeed, it could be argued that individuals in
crowdsourcing arrangements possess unobserved characteristics which make them qualitatively
different from more traditional salaried workers, thus leading to a problem of self-selection into
online labour markets. To account for this potential selection bias and offer a more appropriate
comparison between the different outcomes, we adopt an instrumental variable approach. We
choose the following instrumental variable two stages least squares specification:
(1) Yi = α2 + Pˆiλ+X
′
iγ2 + Fiϕ2 + e2i
(2) Pi = α1 + Ziφ+X
′
iγ1 + Fiϕ1 + e1i
where i refers to each individual, Y is the set of our outcome variables (hourly earnings,
working hours - including hourly earnings and working hours when controlling for unpaid
tasks, indicators for skill match and for labour force use21), X is a vector of k–2 controls22
and F is a dummy which indicates whether the respondent is female.23
In the first stage regression (2), the treatment P (a dummy which equals 1 when crowdwork
is the individual’s main paid activity) is regressed on our chosen instrument Z plus the same
controls we use in the second stage regression (1). Using the predicted value of P (the estimated
linear probability of working in the platform) in (1), we obtain the impact of crowdwork on
our desired outcome through the coefficient λ. In case the treatment P is really assigned
exogenously conditionally on Z, then the coefficient on λ will not suffer from selection bias
(Angrist, 2006).
5.1 Instrumental variable identification
Drawing from the demographical evidence from the studies mentioned above (see Section
3) a number of instruments have been considered for our analysis. Not all candidates for
instrumentation, however, could be used, due to differences between surveys. We nonetheless
considered and tested different types of potential instruments.
21With dummies indicating whether the respondents believes to her skills to be adequate (on inadequate) for
her current occupation, and dummies indicating whether said person is currently looking for another occupation
and if it would like to work more.
22In our final model the controls are: age, age squared, number of people in household, main earner, main
source of income, education, marital status, health status and state controls.
23The need for this specification, with the gender dummy appearing outside the X vector, will be explained
in subsection 4.1, as the coefficient ϕ2 will be used to adjust split sample estimates to the whole population.
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Initially, we looked at exogenous variables such as age or having a debilitating health
condition, which are both significantly correlated with crowdwork (age: -0.1643***; poor
health: 0.0193***).24 However, we discarded those variables as we believe their adoption would
lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction, biasing our estimates downwardly: younger
workers typically earn less than older individuals, while workers in poor health may take
longer times to complete their work activities, leading to a reduction in hourly earnings.
We then considered an alternative instrument: time spent in caregiving at home. This
variable is potentially a good instrument since it is exogenous and potentially highly correlated
with crowdwork. The underlying reasoning is that people may be more involved in crowdwork
if they are compelled to stay at home to look after children or elderly relatives: this type
of work, indeed, can be a reasonable source of income for them, given their circumstances.
The choice of this instrument, however, imposes a few restrictions on the analysis, which are
outlined below.
Both the treatment dataset by ILO and the AWCS and EWCS control datasets capture
time spent in caregiving at home, although in different ways. While caregiving appears as a
dummy in the ILO dataset (where the respondent is asked whether this activity constituted
a full-time commitment before entering crowdwork), it is treated as a continuous variable in
the AWCS and EWCS (where the respondent is asked how many hours per week/per day
has been engaged in these activities). We harmonised the two variables by identifying both a
40 and 15 hours-per-week effort as a full-time caring activity, following the findings from the
Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Survey (Cynkar & Mendes, 2011). Indeed, according to the
Gallup Survey, caregivers working at least 15 hours per week have declared that this activity
significantly affected their worklife.
As shown earlier in Table I, caregiving appears to be highly correlated with crowdwork in
our US sample (estimated correlations: caregiving 15h=0.0521***; caregiving 40h=0.1698***).
This relationship is similar in Europe where caregiving also reveals itself as a significant pre-
dictor of platform work, but only at higher thresholds (caregiving 40h=0.0933***). These
differences hint at the possibility of welfare-biased differential effects of caregiving, as care-
givers may have access to more labour law safeguards in Europe than in US, reducing the
need for auxiliary earnings from crowdwork. Evidence from Germany (Bick, 2016), indicates
that a large fraction of working mothers in part-time would work full-time if they had greater
access to subsidized child care. It is then not unreasonable to expect labour market policies
to similarly influence participation in crowdwork.
At the same time, caregiving also appears to be consistently correlated with the gender of
the respondent: females are over-represented among crowdworkers who are caregivers, with
the correlation between being in caregiving (40h) and crowdwork raising from a full sample
24Sidak-adjusted pairwise correlations across all treatment and control groups. Survey question: : ’Do you
have any illness or health problem which has lasted, or is expected to last, for 6/12 months or more?’
14
(US+EU) correlation coefficient of 0.1920*** to 0.2502*** for the female population. This
finding supports previous evidence that men’s caregiving is a variable phenomenon mainly
layered by societal roles, putting its exogeneity into question,25 and uncovering a serious source
of bias in the instrumental variables estimates, where the exclusion restriction is violated if
gender is found to be correlated with the dependent variable.
Nonetheless, we trust that these issues can be mitigated by assuming that platform work
has no intrinsic effect on gender-dependant outcomes, arguing that, after controlling for indi-
vidual’s characteristics and ability, crowdwork arrangements do not tend to reinforce discrim-
inations based on the sex of the worker, due to the relative anonymity that service providers
enjoy on the platform (as found in Adams & Berg, 2017): clients are, indeed, usually unable
to ascertain the gender of online service providers. Should this assumption hold, all differences
between genders will then be linked to common structural trends across control and treatment
groups which can be identified linearly, and the interaction between gender and the selected
instrument can be added to the instrument pool in the first stage of the estimation process.
As a final check, the 2SLS estimates that can be drawn from the pool of female workers can
be also said to hold for the rest of the sample, after adjusting for structural linear effects. This
adjustment can be done following this simple formula:
(3) exp(φˆ)− 1 = exp(λf ) ∗ exp(ϕ2)− 1
where λf will be the effect of platform work on the female population as predicted by our in-
strument, ϕ2 the linear common gender effect predicted in the full sample model, and exp(φˆ)−1
will indicate the baseline effect of platform work on the selected dependent variable. As our
2SLS estimation will be based on the full US-EU sample,26 region-specific differential gender
effects can also be isolated by the coefficient of the interaction between gender and the regional
dummy, and then applied to the final estimates using a similar procedure, if needed.
In first part of our empirical analysis we will show that the coefficient of the interaction
term between crowdwork and gender is not statistically different from zero when controlling
for other observables, allowing us to generalise the common structural term predicted with ϕ2.
Split sample instrumental variable models – or TS2SLS – have already been explored in
the past by Angrist & Krueger (1995) and Inoue & Solon (2010), to address those events when
the instrument and the outcome are not measured in the same sample. In our case, however,
the two subsamples – male and female – are not homogeneous. It is vital, then, to assume
the differences between the two subsamples to be linear and, most importantly, to assume the
structural relations within them to remain the same.27
25See, for example, Marks et al. (2002) and Gerstel & Gallagher (2001).
26As our selected instrument affects partecipation in crowdwork, but is not intended to randomise regional
assignment, differential effects across countries become a second-order priority. Hence controls for specific
regional difference are sufficient for the estimation of these effects, all with the 2SLS estimation benefitting
from the increased sample size of both treatment and control groups.
27As argued by Zhao Q. & D. (2017) in a similar context.
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As long as these assumptions are reasonable, we only need to worry about the causal chan-
nel between caregiving and our outcome variables on the female population. Evidence from the
literature on female caregiving finds that working hours – and, by extension – total earnings
are affected by this condition (see Wakabayashi & Donato, 2005, and Earle & Heymann, 2012)
but, to the best of our knowledge, there is no mention of hourly earnings.28 We believe that,
with the inclusion of our observable controls, we are able to filter out the endogenous effects of
caregiving – due to its relationships with household size and marital status especially. In any
case, we do not believe caregiving to be able to influence ability in any way: it is reasonable
to assume that caregiving affects the opportunity to work more, not the relative skills of an
individual – and how much the labour market rewards these skills.
A similar reasoning prevents the use of this instrument for the estimation of the effect of
crowdwork on some of the other working dimensions, such as working hours. As the crowd-
work ’complier’ group29 is made out of individuals spending a significant amount of time in
caregiving, we can expect 2SLS estimates of working hours and weekly earnings to inevitably
suffer from a downward bias, as will be discussed in the next section. In such a case, we will
then mostly rely on OLS to obtain more reasonable – yet still biased – estimates of these
dimensions.
6 Results
Columns (1) to (3) from Table II present the results of our OLS regressions using the US
sample of crowdworkers from the ILO survey and the controls from the AWCS. The dependent
variable is hourly earnings and the table shows different regressions with an increasing number
of controls, with an initial sample including a total of 3,128 workers.30 Our key variable of
interest is the dummy for working in crowdwork: the dummy identifies all interviewed US
crowdworkers. Additional key controls are: gender, age (and its squared term), number of
people in the household, marital status (whether the respondent is married or lives with a
partner), and two dummies indicating whether the respondant is the main contributor to the
household’s income and whether crowdwork is her main source of income. We also take into
account a set of controls for the different US and EU28 states of residence (with a total of
79 states) and for the level of education (distinguishing among six different education levels).
Standard errors are also robust to clustering on the level of the federal or member state.
As shown in the table, the effect of crowdwork on earnings is always negative and signi-
ficant, confirming the results from the descriptive analyses of previous studies where earnings
28Our findings – see Table VI below – similarly suggest that hourly earnings are not significantly affected by
caregiving after controlling for other observables.
29We here define as ’compliers’ all individuals in caregiving who participate in crowdwork arrangements and
all individuals not in caregiving who stay in traditional forms of work.
30Observations with missing values are excluded from the estimation.
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Table II
OLS estimates of the effect of online platform work on earnings in US & EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
US EU US+EU
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Working in crowdwork -1.032*** -1.010*** -1.012*** -1.198*** -1.116*** -1.067*** -1.007***
(0.036) (0.043) (0.055) (0.072) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043)
Female -0.245*** -0.179*** -0.181*** -0.127*** -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.195***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.061) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.061)
Crowdwork × Female 0.004 -0.103* -0.043
(0.069) (0.051) (0.054)
EU × Female 0.129**
(0.059)
Age 0.052*** 0.030** 0.030** 0.023*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of people in household -0.032** -0.032** 0.002 0.002 -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Married or living with a partner 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.115***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Main earner in household 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.155***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Main source of income 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.127* 0.133* 0.156***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.066) (0.068) (0.043)
Observations 3,218 3,217 3,217 27,758 27,676 27,676 30,893
Adjusted R-squared 0.361 0.389 0.389 0.367 0.377 0.377 0.378
State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N otes: State clustered standard errors in parentheses. Control sample restricted to employed and self-employed individuals in working
age, excluding freelancers working from home.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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from micro-tasks are well below national averages (as found in Berg, 2015 and Hara et al.,
2017). The effect of the female dummy is also always negative and significant, confirming a
gender pay gap in the labour market. In the third column we present our full specification:
all the relevant regressors, controls and interactions are included. The regression shows that
crowdwork has a negative and significant effect (indicating a 63.6% reduction in earnings),31
while both dummies for being the main earner in the family and for the surveyed occupation
being the respondent’s main job are positive and significant. Controlling for all other observ-
ables, the interaction term between gender and crowdwork is not statistically different from
zero, while, most notably, the coefficient on gender alone retains its magnitude and signific-
ance, showing a negative linear effect on earnings (-16.5%) and no notable variation between
specification (2) and (3), where the interaction is introduced. This finding provides support to
our hypothesis that crowdwork platforms do not generate any intrinsic gender discriminatory
effect other than reaffirming common structural gaps.
Columns (4) to (6) present the estimates for the effect of crowdwork on hourly earnings
on the European sample. Here the initial number of complete observations is 27,578, referring
to the total number of EU28 workers included in the ILO and EWCS sample. The sign
and magnititude of the crowdwork coefficient is always negative and significant and, after
controlling for all covariates in column (6), the effect is now much closer to our estimate for
the US sample, equalling to a 65.5% reduction in hourly earnings. The effect of the gender
dummy is also negative and significant, this time indicating a smaller reduction in earnings
(-6.8%). A negative gender effect can also be found across european crowdworkers, albeit with
a 5% statistical significance.
A significative improvement in our estimates is offered in column (7), where a full sample
(US+EU) specification is presented. The difference in general region-specific gender effects is
isolated by the coefficient of the EU × Female interaction term, whose positive effect coun-
teracts the negative sign of the Female term, now referring to the baseline US sample.32 Most
importantly, the Crowdwork × Female interaction turns not significant again, as its effect
seems to be recaptured by the regional gender effects, confirming that crowdwork platforms
do not generate any intrinsic gender discrimination on earnings.33 Finally, the effect of crowd-
work on PPP-adjusted net hourly earnings is estimated up to a 63.5% reduction. Also, in
all instances, the negative effect of working in digital labour market is slightly reduced when
crowdwork is the main source of income.
Table III presents the results of our OLS regressions taking into account the degree of
routine intensity and abstractness of the tasks performed, with reference to both the treatment
31Given the magnitude of the effect of crowdwork on earnings, it should be noted that log normal interpreta-
tions might be incorrect since the parameters are far above the 0.1 threshold and must then be exponentiated.
32The regional dummy for EU (not significant, as its effects are fully captured by the state controls) is
omitted from the table.
33This finding confirms the results in Adams & Berg (2017).
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Figure II
Estimated OLS coefficients from varying task-intensity splits (US+EU)
N otes: OLS coefficients for the ’Working in crowdwork’ dummy after restricting the control sample
(US+EU) by increasing routine task-intensity and decreasing abstract task-intensity. Sample sizes
from each estimation are reported as a percentage of the full control sample. Control sample
restricted to employed and self-employed individuals in working age, excluding freelancers working
from home.
and the control samples. It is worth pointing out that, while occupation could be considered
a ’bad control’ and, by inducing bias in the estimates (as discussed in Angrist et al., 2011),
certainly cannot be used in the 2SLS estimation stage unless a different instrument is chosen,
it is however true that an analysis which focuses only on the individuals who perform similar
occupations can enhance our ability to explore the actual wage premium of traditional workers
with respect to platform workers. To this aim, we split our treatment and control samples for
both United States and Europe according to the degree of routine task intensity, abstractness,
and a combination of the two indicators. We assign routine and abstract task intensity score
to individuals in the control group using the indicators from Autor & Dorn (2013), where each
occupation is given a score based on O*NET task measures. We then compute, using a similar
methodology, the same scores from the ILO sample, disaggregating each observation into the
five most common tasks, and assigning each task a score based on the routine and non-routine
cognitive O*NET measures, as reported in Acemoglu & Autor (2011), and then averaging the
scores after reweighting each task by its relative frequency. Finally, we restrict the control
groups to those observations whose routine and non-routine task intensity falls within the
range of scores obtained in the treatment sample. Our results show that the coefficients do
not diverge excessively from our initial results, displaying a negative – and slightly stronger –
effect on earnings for platform workers, in all the regressions considered (US, EU, US+EU),
20
indicating that the routine and abstract content of micro-task jobs might not capture the
reduction in earnings from traditional professions in any way.
As we cannot ascertain the full comparability of the routine and abstract task-intensity
scores between controls and treatment, we provide a further robustness check in Figure II,
where we restrict the control sample by decreasing abstract and increasing routine task-
intensity scores, and estimate the ’Working in crowdwork’ coefficient (y-axis) using the same
least squares specifications from Table III (columns 7 and 8). The x-axis indicates the minimum
abstract task-intensity and the maximum routine task-intensity score used for the sample split.
The figure suggests that, the more the abstract intensity of control occupations is lowered,
the more the effect of crowdwork on earnings is reduced. A similar decrease is made evid-
ent when we set a higher routine content for control occupations. Nevertheless, our previous
interpretation is not invalidated: these contractions in the effect of crowdwork on earnings
are very minimal, as we consider that the coefficient fully maintains its sign and significancy,
and that the estimated effect ranges from 57.8 to 65.5% only when performing splits on ab-
stract intensity, and from 63.5 to 61.5% when increasing the minumum routine content. The
great majority of the earnings differential between platform and traditional work remains then
unexplained by the abstract and routine task-intensity of crowdsourcing.
OLS estimates for working hours indicators are shown in Table IV.When investigating time
spent on the platform, the estimates appear particularly sensitive to the way working hours are
computed. In particular, in columns (1), (4) and (7) we find that, on average, when only paid
activities are considered, working in crowdwork reduces the number of weekly working hours
by 16 hours, also indicating a 7 hours differential between US and the EU platform workers.
When crowdwork is also the main source of income, these figures are further reduced, and all
crowdworkers appear to be working circa 7 hours less than traditional workers, all else being
equal.
If, however, the indicator is adjusted for the time spent in unpaid tasks – as in columns
(2), (5) and (8) – the magnitude of the coefficient changes again, showing a 9 hours increase in
working hours across the US and the EU. For individuals whose main occupation is crowdwork,
the differential with the control is reduced even more, to the point that, on average, US
crowdworkers appear to be working even more than comparable workers. Significant disparities
with the European sample remain, indicating that, for EU workers, there is no discernible
difference in working hours between platform and traditional workers when crowdwork consists
in the main source of income of an individual.
Moving to factor utilisation, we are presented with some intriguing figures. In (3), (6)
and (9), our OLS model suggest that most platform workers would like to work more than
they currently do in either crowdwork or in other forms of employment, suggesting a degree of
factor under-utilisation. While not shown in the table, we also found out that these figures are
halved when respondents are asked whether they would prefer to work in non-crowdwork occu-
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pations (even when crowdwork is the main source of income). These findings partially confute
the perception of platform work as a temporary form of occupation for the underemployed,
configuring it as a rather stable condition with unremarkable mobility towards other forms of
employment – for many, at least. However, even if not actively looking for a job, this status
presents some uncanny similarities to the ones of involuntary part-timers or inactive persons
with labour force attachment, where individuals would like to work more but are unable or too
discouraged to look for other forms of employment, and, for that, crowdwork could be found
to be related to slack in the labour market. The idiosyncratic relationship between working
nearly as many hours as traditional workers while still desiring to work more, alongside with
the largely low earnings, may corroborate the findings from Horton & Chilton (2010), if we
inductively assume that platform workers are usually unable to meet their earnings targets.
It should be noted, however, that while these remarks could reflect the condition of many
online workers, crowdwork could still represent a convenient source of auxiliary income for
many others.
Our IV estimates for hourly earnings are displayed in Table V, together with the OLS
estimates from both the full sample and a female-only sample. 34 In the 2SLS regressions the
estimates for the full sample and the female sample show both weak predictive power when
instrumenting caregiving with a 15 hours weekly threshold (columns 3 and 4): while the first
stage displays a high R-squared, the crowdwork coefficient is never statistically different from
zero and the instrument always fails to pass the F score test for excluded instruments.
The 40 hours threshold generates instead much more reasonable coefficients for working
in crowdwork (columns 5 and 6), predicting a general and statistically significant reduction
(-63.46%; coeff.: -1.007) in hourly earnings. While very close to our OLS estimates, it could be
argued that these estimates still suffer from bias due to the interaction between caregiving and
gender (even if this interaction is included in the instrument pool). Restricting our study to
the female population, working on crowdwork platforms reduces earnings by 60.07% (column
6, coeff: -0.918) over working age women, all else being equal. This is well below the -1.05 (-
65.18%) log points that the least squares model would predict over the female sample (column
2). In both cases, anyway, all instruments pass the F score tests for excluded instruments,
with the first-stage partial R2 also yielding remarkable results (see Bound et al., 1995).
As argued earlier, while we cannot confidently attest the exogeneity of the instrument on
the male population, we still believe that caregiving is exogenous to the female population,
implying that, if randomisation is achieved though its channel, the -0.918 coefficient could be
considered close to an unbiased parameter of the effect of crowdwork on the earnings of the
whole population after accounting for the linear gender estimates, with women still earning
circa 20% less than men in both control and treatment groups. After adjusting for the rest of
34In the former, caregiving and the its interaction with gender is instrumented; in the latter, only caregiving
is.
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Table V
2SLS estimates of the effect of online platform work on earnings in US and Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US+EU US+EU US+EU US+EU US+EU US+EU
Caregiving (15h) Caregiving (40h)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES full sample female only full sample female only full sample female only
Working in crowdwork -1.028*** -1.055*** 0.518 0.902 -1.007*** -0.918***
(0.041) (0.056) (1.060) (1.158) (0.247) (0.236)
Female -0.212*** -0.284*** -0.213***
(0.045) (0.059) (0.049)
EU × Female 0.145*** 1.348*** 0.207*** 0.146***
(0.046) (0.089) (0.053) (0.048)
Age 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Age squared -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of people in household -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.010 -0.004 -0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Married or living with a partner 0.115*** 0.104*** 0.121*** 0.081*** 0.115*** 0.102***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.018)
Main earner in household 0.155*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.075** 0.154*** 0.120***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.024) (0.031) (0.016) (0.019)
Main source of income 0.153*** 0.156*** 1.503* 1.818* 0.171 0.271
(0.042) (0.057) (0.894) (0.975) (0.227) (0.211)
Observations 30,893 15,921 30,893 15,921 30,893 15,921
Adjusted R-squared 0.378 0.366 0.151 0.051 0.255 0.231
State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Test 3.968 4.657 12.40 23.25
First Stage R2 0.738 0.712 0.742 0.722
N otes: State clustered standard errors in parentheses. Control sample restricted to employed and self-employed individuals in
working age, excluding freelancers working from home.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Figure III
Estimated 2SLS coefficients from varying full-time caregiving thresholds (US+EU)
N otes: Second-stage coefficients for the ’Working in crowdwork’ dummy instrumented through a
caregiving instrument with increasing weekly hours threshold. Control sample restricted to em-
ployed and self-employed individuals in working age, excluding freelancers working from home.
Table VI
Effect of caregiving on hourly earnings (US+EU)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample Female only
C+T C T C+T C T
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Caregiving (15h) 0.008 0.005 0.032 0.033* 0.026 0.116
(0.012) (0.012) (0.060) (0.019) (0.020) (0.076)
Caregiving (40h) -0.015 -0.009 0.032 0.017 -0.011 0.116
(0.030) (0.029) (0.060) (0.032) (0.030) (0.076)
Observations 30,893 28,699 2,194 15,921 14,921 1,000
Control covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N otes: "C+T"(control and treatment samples), "C" (control sample), "T" (treatment
sample). Notes: State clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: nat-
ural logarithm of hourly PPP adjusted nominal earnings (US dollars). The dummy caregiving
is set at the 15h and 40h threshold, and the sample is reduced to the control (AWCS+EWCS)
groups in (2) and to the treatment (ILO) group in (3). Covariate list: age, age squared, num-
ber of people in household, main earner, main source of income, education, marital status,
health status and state controls
25
the sample using equation (3), we obtain a baseline reduction in earnings of 67.7%, rasing our
confidence in the results from the previous full sample specification. This interpretation holds
even if we assume that there is some sort of gender based self-selection into the crowdworker
population: should this hypothesis be true, then only our interacted OLS estimates would be
biased. Since, however, we are now interested in the effect of earnings, irrespective of gender,
this estimate could be considered appropriate for both men and women if the sample conforms
to the target population.
In order to achieve a better understanding of the variability of the 2SLS estimates as
the instrument changes its threshold, and to reduce the conceptual differences between the
definitions of full time caregiving between the control and treatment groups, Figure III plots
the selected threshold against the estimated effect of working in crowdwork, together with their
significance level. It is evident from the figure that, with caregiving becoming a significant
predictor of crowdwork at its 36 hours per week threshold, the estimated coefficients also
follow a more reliable pattern with little variation in their sign and statistical significance.
Most importantly, full and split sample estimates conform to very similar trends, providing
evidence that our instrument choice adequately controls for gendered bias in caregiving.
We do not report 2SLS estimates for working hours. The reason is that the condition
of caregiving may prevent crowdworkers from working more or from pursuing other sources
of income, whereas the desire to work more may be biased by the complications associated
with the transition to caregiving – as reported in Marks et al. (2002). In this case, our
interpretations from Table IV should then be understood as neither final or conclusive, and
alternative instruments should be considered for this specific analysis.
Some final checks for our instrument are provided in Table VI, where hourly earnings
are regressed over the instrument and the full set of control covariates across partitions of
our sample.35 While caregiving appears to have a negative and sligthly significant effect on
earnings in our full sample of female workers, these effects are rendered insignificant when
performing the same regressions over the control and treatment groups, indicating that the
negative sign of that initial coefficient is entirely linked to the first-stage relationship between
caregiving and crowdwork. Notably, in no case the caregiving coefficient reaches any level
of statistical significance once modelling the same regressions on the full sample (men and
women). In any case, while these checks and the first-stage tests give us a good confidence
in our results, it could be argued that our model may still suffer from some form of bias, due
to the inability to distinguish between different forms of caregiving – a problem which will be
addressed in the next section.36
Last but not least, we model hourly earnings again while accounting for time spent in
unpaid activities in Table VII. As a consequence, hourly earnings – columns (1), (3) and (5)
35This analysis is similar to the one presented in Madestam et al. (2013).
36We here refer to our inability to disentangle caring for children from caring for elderly or disabled relatives.
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– fall well below our previous estimates, displaying a coefficient of -1.323 (-73.3%), with the
prediction moving to -70.6% when instrumenting our treatment in column (7). Comparable
results also apply to the female population (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8).
7 Robustness checks
In this section we perform robustness checks for our findings. The choice of caregiving in
the female population as an instrument for participation in crowdwork calls for a number
of robustness checks, as it could be argued that the effect of caregiving on participation in
crowdwork may change with time, or that caregiving affects participation but not the duration
of crowdwork arrangements. Differences in control and treatment survey items may then
cause issues with identification of caregivers when these individuals have been working on the
platform for a long time.
While the EWCS and AWCS surveys inquire how much time does the respondent currently
spend in caregiving, the ILO survey records whether the respondent was engaged in full-time
caregiving right before starting to work on the platform. The design of the ILO survey then
allows us to maintain the causal channel between caregiving and platform work (back when
they started working online), while the controls enable us to identify whether comparable in-
dividuals in the complier group are still employed in traditional forms of work. This approach,
however, imposes that, if caregiving is an exogenous determinant of crowdworking, we should
reasonably assume that crowdworkers who entered this form of employment due to caregiving
are still engaged in this activity. To account for these issues, we control in Table VIII for time
spent in the current occupation, a control that was previously excluded from the final model
due to its – obvious – collinear relationship with our outcome and treatment variables.
In the final model of Table VII, we made the assumption that most crowdworkers have not
been engaged in this form of employment for a long time and the ones acting as caregivers
when starting platform work are still engaged as such, based on the finding that 75.51% of
crowdworkers have not been engaged in this form of employment for more than two years.
We now relax this assumption in Table VIII, where we run the same final IV specifications
from Table V, adding dummies for years spent in current occupation along with the previously
chosen controls in columns (1) and (5).37 In the following specifications – columns (2) to (4)
and (5) to (8) – we perform a similar analysis by restricting the sample to people who have
been working for less than 4 years, 2 years and finally 1 year. By comparing workers that
have been working in their current occupation for similar time, the more we reduce the years
they have been spending in their current occupation, the more our assumption that these
workers are still in caregiving is made more reasonable: in this way, we believe to be able to
filter out the effects of time spent in a given occupation through the first stage of the 2SLS
37The results are reported for both the 15h and 40h caregiving thresholds.
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model. The trade-off is that, the more we reduce our sample size, the more our estimates
lose in precision. Nevertheless, the interpretation of our results stays relatively unchanged,
with the coefficients retaining their signs and significance. The magnitude of our coefficient
for platform work, however, seems somewhat sensible to the sample reduction: in any case, it
never overestimates the coefficient of the OLS model, while remaining relatively stable after
individuals with more than 5 years of employment have been accounted for. After adjusting
for gender specific linear trends, as in equation (3), we can reasonably argue that working in
crowdwork generates a negative effect on earnings sitting between 67.2 and 58.35% less than
for comparable workers after controlling for time spent in current occupation.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, our econometric model may also raise a number of concerns
with regards to the exogeneity of our instrument. Evidence from a number of studies – such as
Kremer & Chen (2002) and D’Addio & Mira D’Ercole (2005) – suggests that fertility may be
influenced by a number of social drivers. While we believe that our controls are sufficiently apt
at filtering these influences out,38 we here intend to relax this assumption and treat fertility as
endogenous. Even if, as discussed, conflicting survey designs prevent us from fully separating
individuals caring for children from the ones caring for disabled or elderly relatives, we can
nonetheless identify individuals in caregiving who, at the same time, do not have kids – and,
therefore, are most surely not caring for children. We then switch our instrument with the
new one (’Caring for elderly or disabled relatives only’) and present our results in Table IX,
adopting the same approach used for the robustness checks in Table VIII. The reductions in
the ’complier’ treatment group leave to an increase in the variability of our estimates which
this time appear particularly sensible to the reduction in sample size. Since this time we are
only able to compare individuals with no children, some kind of bias can still be expected: in
fact, while our estimates maintain their sign and do not diverge too much from our results in
Table VIII, they surely suffer from some level of overestimation. In any case, these results do
not contradict our previous findings.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided an empirical analysis of the effect of crowdwork on working
conditions in both the United States and Europe. We use a quasi-experimental design and
we assemble data from different sources, coming from online surveys on crowdworkers, web
plugins and commonly used extensive surveys on workers’ conditions in the US and Europe. To
the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to provide an unbiased comparison
of platform and traditional workers in terms of earnings and working conditions. While we
show that the effect of crowdsourcing on earnings is not as large as it could be expected from
38In particular, we believe that controls for education, marital status and household size can adequately
capture these endogenous variations.
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descriptive statistics, our estimates still cast a dark light over platform work: crowdsourcers
still earn 70.6% less than comparable workers in terms of ability, while spending nearly as
much time working in the platform as their counterparts do in traditional occupations. Most
importantly, labour force in crowdworking arrangements appears to be highly under-utilised,
with all crowdworkers being more likely to be left wanting for more work than comparable
individuals. All these findings, along with the fact that these individuals do not appear
to be looking for other jobs more than ’traditional’ workers, relegate crowdworkers into a
new category of idle workers whose human capital is not being fully utilised nor adequately
compensated.
It should be noted that while these results mostly hold for US and EU platform workers,
the external validity of our estimates is threatened by the nature of crowdwork platforms
themselves and, while our conclusions may be extended to routine-task intensive platforms
such as Crowdflower or Clickworker, our analysis may not hold in other contexts where more
diversified tasks, requiring more creative input from service providers, are offered, such as in
the case of UpWork.39
Finally, it should be highlighted that we have here only compared the effects of crowdwork
between similar workers in terms of their ability and their personal characteristics, but we have
not delved into the causes of the differences in earnings and job quality between crowdworkers
and traditional workers. We were able to exclude that most of these differences were caused
by the routine and abstract content of online platform jobs, as workers with comparable
routine and abstract tasks still retain most of their salary premium, indicating that the relative
simplicity and repetitiveness of these tasks does not necessarily lead to a sizeable decrease in
earnings. This leads us to believe that this effect could be better explained by the following
factors:
1. the competition from equally skilled but cheaper labour from other countries within the
same platform;
2. the lack of labour rights and minimum standards stemming from the status of independ-
ent contractors.
In the first case, the influx of ’digital immigrants’ may lead to an increase in labour supply
and infra-task competition, lowering remunerations. In the second case, the monopsonistic
nature of platforms enables them to impose a heavy markup over their workers, while allowing
clients to operate at prices well below the market’s marginal costs. We believe that the poor
working conditions crowdsourcers have to live with are the result of an interplay between
these elements, and it is up to future research to test each of these hypotheses individually,
disentangling the effect of each one of them from the other.
39Though a case could be made that Upwork and similar freelance marketplaces (as defined in Berg et al.,
2018) are inherently different from the crowdwork arragements we studied.
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Appendix - Summary statistics
Table A.1
Descriptive statistics, US traditional occupations controls (AWCS 2015)
(1)
count mean sd min p5 p50 p95 max
Hourly nominal earnings (USD) 1847 30.77 207.9 0 2.301 17.58 58.81 10547.9
Weekly working hours 1910 39.06 11.65 0 20 40 60 112
Age 1941 41.02 12.61 18 21 41 61 64
Female 1941 0.463 0.499 0 0 0 1 1
Married or living with a partner 1941 0.516 0.500 0 0 1 1 1
No. of people in household 1941 3.063 1.672 1 1 3 6 12
Main earner in household 1891 0.603 0.489 0 0 1 1 1
Educ.: no high school diploma 1941 0.0638 0.244 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: high school diploma 1941 0.502 0.500 0 0 1 1 1
Educ.: technical/associate 1941 0.0966 0.296 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: bachelor’s degree 1941 0.208 0.406 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: master’s degree 1941 0.0944 0.292 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: higher 1941 0.0356 0.185 0 0 0 0 1
Health: Very Good 1891 0.132 0.338 0 0 0 1 1
Health: Good 1891 0.407 0.491 0 0 0 1 1
Health: Fair 1891 0.345 0.475 0 0 0 1 1
Health: Poor 1891 0.0991 0.299 0 0 0 1 1
Health: Very Poor 1891 0.0176 0.132 0 0 0 0 1
Caregiving (15h/week) 1941 0.149 0.356 0 0 0 1 1
Caregiving (40h/week) 1941 0.0824 0.275 0 0 0 1 1
N otes: Weighted summary statistics. Control sample restricted to employed and self-employed individuals in
working age, excluding freelancers working from home.
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Table A.2
Descriptive statistics, EU traditional occupations controls (EWCS 2015)
(1)
count mean sd min p5 p50 p95 max
Hourly nominal earnings (USD) 26991 17.06 91.89 0.00319 3.935 11.83 29.77 5687.8
Weekly working hours 31650 37.18 11.90 1 15 40 55 126
Age 32429 42.21 11.39 15 23 43 60 64
Female 32429 0.478 0.500 0 0 0 1 1
Married or living with a partner 32429 0.697 0.459 0 0 1 1 1
No. of people in household 32312 2.882 1.268 1 1 3 5 10
Main earner in household 32429 0.595 0.491 0 0 1 1 1
Educ.: no high school diploma 32316 0.161 0.367 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: high school diploma 32316 0.448 0.497 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: technical/associate 32316 0.147 0.354 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: bachelor’s degree 32316 0.127 0.333 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: master’s degree 32316 0.108 0.311 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: higher 32316 0.00856 0.0921 0 0 0 0 1
Health: Very Good 32400 0.261 0.439 0 0 0 1 1
Health: Good 32400 0.532 0.499 0 0 1 1 1
Health: Fair 32400 0.185 0.389 0 0 0 1 1
Health: Poor 32400 0.0201 0.140 0 0 0 0 1
Health: Very Poor 32400 0.00228 0.0477 0 0 0 0 1
Caregiving (15h/week) 32429 0.170 0.375 0 0 0 1 1
Caregiving (40h/week) 32429 0.0197 0.139 0 0 0 0 1
N otes: Weighted summary statistics. Control sample restricted to employed and self-employed individuals in
working age, excluding freelancers working from home. Earnings are adjusted for purchasing power parity
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Table A.3
Descriptive statistics, US+EU crowdwork treatment (ILO 2015, 2017)
(1)
count mean sd min p5 p50 p95 max
Hourly nominal earnings (USD) 2341 7.166 18.72 0.0489 0.568 4.888 17.39 568.4
Hourly nominal earnings (USD)† 2302 4.697 11.72 0 0.300 3.125 12 357.1
Weekly working hours 2369 19.36 23.69 0 2 13 50 168
Weekly working hours† 2320 26.03 30.56 0 2 18 70 336
Age 2393 35.03 10.93 18 21 33 57 83
Female 2393 0.448 0.497 0 0 0 1 1
Married or living with a partner 2393 0.455 0.498 0 0 0 1 1
No. of people in household 2393 2.768 1.377 1 1 3 5 10
Main earner in household 2393 0.806 0.396 0 0 1 1 1
Educ.: no high school diploma 2391 0.0247 0.155 0 0 0 0 1
Educ.: high school diploma 2391 0.356 0.479 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: technical/associate 2391 0.132 0.339 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: bachelor’s degree 2391 0.334 0.472 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: master’s degree 2391 0.125 0.330 0 0 0 1 1
Educ.: higher 2391 0.0284 0.166 0 0 0 0 1
Health: Very Good 2392 0.258 0.437 0 0 0 1 1
Health: Good 2392 0.528 0.499 0 0 1 1 1
Health: Fair 2392 0.174 0.379 0 0 0 1 1
Health: Poor 2392 0.0347 0.183 0 0 0 0 1
Health: Very Poor 2392 0.00585 0.0763 0 0 0 0 1
Caregiving (15h/week) 2393 0.166 0.372 0 0 0 1 1
Caregiving (40h/week) 2393 0.166 0.372 0 0 0 1 1
N otes: Summary statistics. Earnings are deflated to the reference period (local currency) and then adjusted for
purchasing power parity. †: adjusted for time spent in unpaid activities
40
